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Pramod K. Nayar
If, as Michael Ignatieff proposes, human rights is the lingua franca to 
articulate and address the problems of suffering (7), then it follows that 
particular forms of suffering might generate specific forms of narrative 
within this language of rights. Local social and cultural conditions of 
atrocity are tied in to universal discourses—including legal—of human 
rights via a narrative that is simultaneously local and global, even as the 
legal domain of human rights permeates other realms of politics and 
culture (Ahmed and Stacey 1). An atrocity narrative is, then, irreducibly 
“double voiced”: it is located within a discursive structure specific to a 
time and place, thus ensuring that the atrocity is made recognizable, 
and the demand for rights is made part of a universal schema of values. 
Anthony Langlois argues that the discourse of human rights presup-
poses definitions of the “human,” thereby proposing a narrative tradi-
tion in which the “human” emerges (Langlois). The circulation and/or 
acceptance of narratives about what it means to be human determine 
what is defined as a “human right” (Slaughter). 
My essay discusses Dalit life writing, a genre of Indian texts that 
emerged first in regional languages, and, in the1990s, in English; the 
genre situates personal and collective suffering within a larger discourse 
of human rights. “Dalit,” derived from the Marathi—the predominant 
language of Maharashtra state—literally means “of the earth” and “that 
which has been ground down” and now signifies socially oppressed caste 
groups and tribals. Ironically, these marginalized Dalit peoples consti-
tute a large segment of the population, and have been forced to mobilize 
themselves in order to fight for rights and justice in postcolonial India. 
Dalit human rights emerge in a national context but, as this essay shows, 
can be usefully integrated with a larger international-global discourse of 
suffering, trauma and human rights. While Dalit life writing explicitly 
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references conditions of atrocity in India, it also develops a notion of the 
human subject that can be serviceable within multiple contexts of suf-
fering. Indeed, the genre’s narrative tradition of recognizing the outcast 
human in India offers strong parallels with other such humans the world 
over. In its representation of suffering humans, Dalit life writing gener-
ates abject-types for (possible) ethical appropriation by a global literary 
field for human rights. I invoke “abjectification”—deliberately echoing 
“objectification”—to signal social processes of economic and political 
oppression, modes of atrocity and injustice, but also the representational 
process. Abject-types are figures of abjection occurring in literatures of 
trauma across the world. They demonstrate the consequences of politi-
cal and social processes and emerge through representations of atrocity 
and suffering.
“Life writing” includes genres as diverse as autobiographies, autofic-
tions, and confessional forms (Henke). Dalit life writing is a personal 
atrocity memoir that calls attention to oppressive conditions within a 
community. It folds the atrocity narrative into testimonies and eviden-
tiary statements that are explicitly political; as Kay Schaffer and Sidonie 
Smith have demonstrated, memoirs by victims are intrinsically linked to 
contemporary global rights movements (Schaffer and Smith).
Thus far, studies of Dalit people have been largely sociological and 
rarely attentive to the narrative, aesthetic, and formal properties of 
Dalit writings (Dumont; Omvedt; Ghose). Such studies foreground 
crucial issues such as oppression, atrocity, and protest as major themes 
in Dalit writing but do not investigate or provide an account of the 
forms in which these themes are conveyed (exceptions include the 
works of Limbale, Towards an Aesthetics of Dalit Literature; Dharwadker; 
Beth; Nayar, “Bama’s Karukku”; Rege). My earlier work proposed that 
Dalit writing may be treated as testimonio (Nayar, “Bama’s Karukku”). 
Testimonio is defined as “a novel or novella-length book or pamphlet 
. . . , told in the first person by a narrator who is also the real protagonist 
of the events he or she recounts, and whose unit of narration is usually 
a ‘life’ or ‘significant life experience’” (Beverley 92). It is also a narrative 
in which the protagonist writes her or his own experience as an agent of 
a collective memory, identity, and experience (Yudice). 
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The present essay builds upon my earlier reading of Dalit texts and 
explores the formal and aesthetic properties of Dalit life writing in order 
to investigate how the genre generates a discourse of human rights. I 
suggest that, through a narrative strategy that includes trauma writing 
and “performance,” the Dalit text generates (political) roles for the nar-
rator as a primary witness. I identify these narratives as “claims nar-
ratives” that are in dialogue with global human rights discourses and 
with national-local contexts. I argue that Dalit human rights politics 
adopts particular narrative conventions and aesthetic modes to stake 
political claims and that human rights discourses are implicit in Dalit 
life writing. Trauma and testimony discourses in Dalit texts reveal the 
construction of an abject human subject both denied his or her human 
rights and seeking to advance rights claims. In moving from trauma to 
witness to human rights, this essay maps the emergence of an implicit 
human rights narrative rather than fitting Dalit texts into an already ex-
istent paradigm. The genre can be aligned with other similar narratives 
in an “affective cosmopolitanism” that maps global atrocity and suffer-
ing, thereby offering a truly global literature of human rights.
Testimonio narratives are at once personal and public, singular and 
collective, autobiographical and biographical. Written testimony also 
possesses an aesthetic dimension because there is a clear literary com-
ponent to the works of Dalit writers such as Laxman Mane, Lax man 
Gaik wad, Bama, Om pra kash Val miki, and Sharan kumar Lim bale; 
Linda Brooks has termed this the “poetics” of testimonio (Brooks). This 
poetics of testimonio is, in fact, a poetics of atrocity wherein the poet-
ics of trauma and suffering slides into or is informed by a politics of 
rights. Mane’s Upara (1997), literally “outsider,” was first published in 
Marathi, and is an account of his life as a member of the Kaikadi caste. 
Uchalya (1998), or “branded,” is Gaikwad’s autobiography of his life as 
a member of a caste declared a “criminal tribe” by the colonial adminis-
tration in nineteenth century India as well as his evolution into a Dalit 
activist and Ambedkarite, as the followers of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar’s 
ideology, politics, and ideals are called. Bama’s Karukku (2000) is the 
first autobiography by a Dalit woman in Tamizh, the language of the 
southern Indian state of Tamizh Nadu. Karukku differs from other Dalit 
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autobiographies in that Bama’s position as a Christian allows her to 
unpack the caste prejudices that exist even in the convent and demon-
strate the pernicious hold of caste across India. Bama writes that, despite 
the Dalits’ conversion to Christianity, they remain “lower castes” in the 
convent: at once outside the caste system, yet always inside it. Valmiki’s 
Joothan (2003), first published in Hindi, is an autobiographical account 
of growing up as a member of the “lower castes” in rural India and his 
journey through education to a metropolitan life, even as caste contin-
ues to haunt him and his family. Limbale’s The Outcaste (2003), again 
translated from the Marathi, is the autobiography of a Mahar, or “lower-
caste,” boy who fights all caste-informed odds and goes on to become a 
major literary figure and government official. Each text is primarily an 
autobiography. The narrator in each shows a remarkable ability to shift 
narration between her or his own life and the lives of the communities, 
with the text functioning as a social document with a specific political 
agenda. This agenda, I argue, is one of human rights.
I. Trauma and the Dalit Memoir
The Dalit atrocity memoir is a trauma narrative that embodies individ-
ual, collective, and cultural injury through a “traumatic realism” (Roth-
berg), a method through which the reader is shocked into recognition 
of a world that violates all previous experiences. The Dalit memoir’s 
“traumatic realism” foregrounds the body as the principal site of oppres-
sion. Dirt, starvation, and pain intersect to make the Dalit body truly 
abject. Valmiki’s Joothan emphasizes the material conditions of Dalit 
life entirely in bodily terms. Describing the village community’s habits 
of personal hygiene, Valmiki writes, “The stench was so overpowering 
that one would choke within a minute” (1). Narendra Jadhav’s Outcaste: 
A Memoir describes how his father was asked to guard a dead body for 
hours on end and then beaten even though he was starving (3–6, 9). In 
Karukku, Bama begins her Preface with a description that metaphorizes 
her caste-based suffering in corporeal terms:
I pick[ed] up the scattered palmyra karukku [a kind of leaf 
with spikes] in the days when I was sent out to gather firewood, 
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scratching and tearing my skin as I played with them. . . . The 
driving forces that shaped this book are many: events that oc-
curred during many stages of my life, cutting me like karukku 
and making me bleed. (xiii) 
In Dalit life writing, the body is the center of various kinds of unpleas-
ant discrimination. Insults, for instance, impinge primarily upon the 
body. Valmiki recounts experiences at school where he is insulted and 
then physically abused by his headmaster (5; see also 47–8, 55, 68–70). 
Insults, he states, “penetrated [his] breast like a knife” (11), were felt 
as “a thousand stings on [his] body” (57), and continue to hurt him 
in (metaphorically) corporeal ways (95, 134). Each day, writes Bama, 
“brings new wounds” (Karukku 105). 
“Traumatic realism” demands such a rhetoric of intensification, which 
forces readers to focus on the human nature of suffering by revealing 
what Jeannine DeLombard calls the embodied subjectivity of the ex-
periences. Dalit life writing presents embodied suffering because speak-
ing of vulnerability, brutalized bodies, and pain defines the Dalit as a 
human (body).1 
Dalit life writing links the individual body’s suffering with collective 
trauma. Thus, Dalit trauma’s “body” is more than the biological body 
of the individual: it is the body of a community/caste, and “trauma” is a 
name “for experiences of socially situated political violence” (Cvetkovich 
3). Dalit life writing links the individual body’s suffering with collec-
tive trauma. The survivor or traumatized body is located within a social 
body, where the suffering is not simply inscribed upon the individual 
but proceeds from a systemic condition and affects the social body of a 
community. Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collective feel 
they have been subject to events that leave an “indelible mark upon 
their consciousnesses” (Alexander 2). It enables them to build solidarity, 
assign responsibility for the causes of the trauma, and thereby to consti-
tute a domain of political action (Alexander 2).
Valmiki gestures at the location of his physical trauma within the cul-
tural trauma of his entire community when he writes: “The cuts I have 
received in the name of caste, even aeons won’t suffice to heal them” (52, 
242
Pr amod  K .  Naya r
emphasis added). Valmiki also states that “The Dalit readers had seen 
their own pain in those pages of mine” (vii). Mane is informed that his 
“offspring can claim the caste of any one of the parents.” He responds, 
“That meant that the caste system . . . should be consolidated!” (191). In 
both cases the protagonist situates his own suffering within the cultural-
economic condition of caste and caste discrimination. Mane discovers 
the persistence of caste identity even as he hopes to erase it. His experi-
ence is a metonym for cultural trauma experienced by his family over 
generations and his community as a whole. His “location” of cultural 
trauma within a social system stakes a claim for recognizing the collec-
tive nature of an individual’s pain; cultural trauma must first be claimed 
by a people before it can be recognized by others. 
Dalit trauma consists of not one injurious event, but instead exists as 
a continuum; it is less a major catastrophe than a series of horrific inci-
dents. Hence, Dalit trauma cannot be placed alongside trauma “events” 
such as the Holocaust because the former’s trauma is “insidious” trauma, 
with no single point or cause of origin (Cvetkovich 32–3). Trauma is ex-
perienced in what Lawrence Langer has called “durational time,” never-
ending and perpetually returning (69). Even subsequent developments 
and changes do not erase the suffering, for the Dalit’s trauma has “an 
endless impact on life” (Caruth 7). In most cases, then, Dalit mem-
oirs eschew specificity of time, chronology, and place. As a narrative 
device, this lack of specificity suggests a continuum of suffering, almost 
as though the Dalits’ clock has stopped registering a passage of time 
except as a continuation of oppression.
“Durational time” also demonstrates a resistance to forgetting, an 
acknowledgment of the history of an event that has never stopped 
being an event. “Durational time” in the Dalit memoir is about trans-
generational trauma, in which an entire family, over generations, is 
subject to suffering, atrocity, and violence.2 The suffering cannot be 
forgotten, not only because it is a feature of everyday life, but because 
it afflicts an entire community or family for generations. Jadhav’s 
memoir about his father maps such trans-generational suffering. At 
the conclusion of his text, Jadhav describes how he took his son to 
visit his former home in order to refresh his own memory of past suf-
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ferings (258–59). Bama opens her narrative by describing how her 
grandmother and other elders had suffered but endured, grateful for 
“favours” from the upper-castes (Karukku 14–15). Valmiki, through-
out Joothan, describes how his mother suffered abuse and exploita-
tion at the hands of the village landlords and other men. Significantly, 
trans-generational trauma extends the event(s) of the past into the 
present and the future. Thus, Mane concludes his narrative with a self-
discovery that is as traumatic as his discovery of caste: “Once again, I 
had acquired all the rights of my caste” (211). Here Mane is referring 
to his re-entry into the community (he had been excommunicated), 
but the re-entry only cements his Dalit identity. Valmiki wonders, in 
the very last lines of his memoir: “Why is caste my only identity?” 
(134). Valmiki’s question introduces the discovery, common in Dalit 
life writing, that one cannot ever abandon one’s caste; consequently, 
as caste is both the source of trauma and foundational to identity, past 
trauma remains a never-ending event.
Claiming cultural trauma requires transforming a narrative of per-
sonal pain into a narrative of larger, collective suffering for the world 
to recognize and acknowledge. In Dalit life writing, this transformation 
takes place through two particular representational strategies: perform-
ance and witnessing. Dalit life writing that embodies individual and 
collective trauma can be productively read as performance in the way 
that Brooks reads testimonio as a poetics. This is not to argue that this 
performance within the narrative is “artifice” or unreal. Rather, it fore-
grounds the literary-aesthetic and representational component of Dalit 
life writing while proposing that such “performances” enable the narra-
tive to acquire a political purchase. 
One performative technique common in Dalit texts is the act of 
staging the scene before the curtain opens on the Dalit narrator’s life. 
Staging involves editorial prefaces, translators’ notes, and the protago-
nist’s own comments preparing readers for the “action” to follow, and 
is marked by three key elements. First, staging includes the “setting” of 
the narrative and its protagonist vis-à-vis the publication process and 
editorial collaboration. Often, Dalit memoirs include prefatory com-
ments from the author, editor, translator, and Dalit protagonist through 
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which the textual performance is initiated. Staging may also include a 
description of the setting in which the editor or translator met the Dalit 
protagonist, the motive for the ensuing testimonio, and, frequently, an 
emotional description of the relations between the protagonist and the 
editor/translator. 
This “staging” is also a feature of oral accounts that recollect with 
strong emotion the abuse, pain, and suffering experienced by the nar-
rator/protagonist. Such an emotional staging highlights the tension 
within the human rights narrative itself: how is the messy, emotional, 
and personal narrative to be codified or standardized into the concept 
of rights, the language of law, and the presentational formats of an “in-
quiry” (Schaffer and Smith 37)? Is there a narrative form available to 
the Dalit narrator to express these concepts? And does human rights 
discourse recognize these articulations as demands for restitution or 
recognition? 
When Limbale describes, in deeply emotional terms, how Mini 
Krishnan, the editor at Oxford University Press, “struggled” with his 
writing, he refers to the process of “translat[ing]” his personal narrative 
into another kind of discourse (Outcaste x). As Limbale employs the 
term, translation indicates not only a linguistic process, but also a trans-
fer between contexts: personal atrocity and a global readership; Dalit 
life and the world at large. Santosh Bhoomkar, the translator of the 
text, thanks Limbale for responding to his (Bhoomkar’s) letters which 
“provided .  .  . [him] .  .  . with meanings of words and phrases which 
were otherwise not available in any dictionary nor known to anybody 
.  .  . except him” (xi). Valmiki, pointing to the contexts of his writing 
and publishing, stresses that well-wishers persuaded him to write down 
and publish his memoirs (vii). P.A. Kolharkar describes how Gaikwad 
“elucidated the meanings of certain obscure passages and unfamiliar 
words” and how Gaikwad’s “explanations” helped him “catch the spirit 
of the book” (Gaikwad vi). Notes from translators and editors are ex-
ergues: they frame the work to follow by suggesting a social context 
and a collaboration between both Dalit and non-Dalit “agents,” and 
they authenticate the text by informing readers that the translation of 
both language and context has been approved by the Dalit protagonist.3 
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Staging is the site of a dialogue, of intercultural exchange where the 
possibilities of a programme of emancipation can emerge in the nexus 
between the Dalit protagonist and the non-Dalit editor/translator/
activist. It emphasizes the progressive re-alignment of social relations 
between sympathetic non-Dalits and Dalit victims/protagonists. This 
alignment is highlighted when Kolharkar thanks the Academy of Letters 
and Gaikwad himself for facilitating the work (vi). Gaikwad, in turn, 
acknowledges the role played by various intellectuals and activists in his 
work (x-xi). Valmiki thanks his manuscript readers and those who sup-
ported him during the writing (viii). In his preface to the 1983 edition 
of Upara, Mane expands the setting of his text and readership: “While 
we understand the sufferings of these nomads, let us actively cooperate 
with each other, in lessening their sufferings. For this is a struggle of 
human liberation” (15). 
Such statements work to authenticate the narrative by highlighting 
the narrator-protagonist’s background and character. They verify that 
what follows is not the story of a fictional character but that of a real 
human being. “Performance,” then, consists of the staging of authentic-
ity, where references to personal settings, personalities, and characters 
lend an air of reality to a context that may otherwise feel alien. Mane 
writes: “Whatever I lived, experienced and saw, I poured into my writ-
ing. . . . If this book proves useful in initiating a social debate . . . I shall 
feel satisfied” (6). In order to emphasize that the writing proceeds from 
an experiential condition rather than from any particular writing ability, 
Kolharkar notes that “Sri Laxman Gaikwad has not had much formal 
education” (Gaikwad vi). Gaikwad foregrounds his community loca-
tions: “I have been experiencing from my childhood the poverty and 
miserable exploitation of the people of this community in which I was 
born, lived and struggled” (vii). Limbale also documents his position 
in order to underscore the authenticity of his narrative. Limbale draws 
attention to the fact that he is the “illegitimate” progeny of the liaison 
between an upper-caste landlord and a Dalit woman: “There is a Patil in 
every village who is also a landowner. He invariably has a whore. I have 
written this so that readers will learn the woes of the son of a whore” 
(Outcaste ix).
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Finally, staging invites readers to participate in the narrative’s social 
agenda, thereby making Dalit life writing a collaboration between 
reader and Dalit protagonist. Gaikwad writes: “The book it is hoped, 
will help the movement for emancipation” (ix). Mane asks, “Can the 
enlightened people of our society, who have appreciated Upara and its 
author come out in the open, breaking social barriers, and join hands 
with the hundreds of Uparas”? (12). Arun Prabha Mukherjee categorizes 
Joothan as a “testimony,” a rewriting of the village pastoral, and a mani-
festo for “revolutionary transformation of society and human conscious-
ness” (Valmiki xxxiii, xxxv, xxxix).
Staging grapples with matters of form: should Dalit texts be read 
merely as political propaganda in autobiographical form? or as revolu-
tionary/resistance writing? or as literature? While most editors and trans-
lators prefer to focus on the political edge of Dalit writing, Mukherjee’s 
preface to Joothan explores the literary-aesthetic merits of a Dalit text. 
Staging asks readers to consider texts in political ways, while paying 
attention to the intensely personal experiences of the protagonists. It 
frames the Dalit at the center of the narrative as a kind of hero/ine 
and, finally, it prepares readers for the “performance” of the Dalit that 
follows.
“Performance” is here taken to mean a fuller representation of a situ-
ation (in fact etymologically “performance” originally meant “bringing 
to completion”) (Turner). Dalit “performance” underscores the human 
nature of the “actors” (Dalit protagonists) and their contexts so that 
viewers/readers become fully aware of the complete set of horrific con-
ditions in which the narrator lives/lived. Dalit narrators perform the 
conscious physical acts or emotional moments with full awareness of 
the audiences they address or face. The “embodied subjectivity” noted 
above is performance par excellence because the Dalit does not narrate a 
story as evidence: instead, he offers himself, as Jacques Derrida has said 
of testimony (38). The representation of his brutalized body is in itself 
the act of testimony. A corporeal act of testimony and the representation 
of corporeal pain is an integral part of the Dalit narrative’s performance 
because it emphasizes the human—a being who suffers pain because of 
an unjust social structure. 
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In addition to this “embodied subjectivity,” the Dalit text, like a 
trauma narrative, forges a connection between politics and emotions. 
The Dalit protagonist-narrator selects elements in her/his story and 
projects or emphasizes an emotional component for the sake of the 
audience. This is not false representation or pretension, but rather 
a fuller representation of the nature of the oppressive incident that 
the audience is cued to register. Performance here is the display, via 
narrative, of emotions when recalling the past. For instance, Limbale 
describes his constant hunger: “We had just pieces of dry bhakari 
which were hardly enough to satisfy the cave of hunger” and “I was 
ashamed of my food and felt guilty eating it.” Limbale underscores 
the significance of food when he describes how the upper-caste chil-
dren gave the Dalit students their leftovers. Later, his mother asks him 
angrily, “Why didn’t you get at least a small portion of it for me? 
Leftover food is nectar.” Limbale reproduces his extreme emotion at 
his mother’s anger: “her words made . . . [the feast] . . . quiver in my 
stomach” (2–3). Gaikwad opens with a description of policemen beat-
ing his grandfather and molesting his grandmother (1–2) and then 
records his own reactions: “Whenever the police visited our hut, I 
panicked. . . . As the police entered and began to search the hut and 
thrash and kick the inmates, I often pissed and shat in my shorts” (3). 
When he speaks at school programmes, he is threatened by the other 
students: “I was terribly afraid of them. Frightened that anyone of 
them might beat me” (81). 
The recording of emotional responses—affect—is the narrative’s 
“traumatic realism” that demonstrates how bodily injury folds into emo-
tional trauma. As in the case of autobiographical narratives, emotional 
content is central to Dalit life writing’s staging of past events (Bauer et 
al). A dramatic performance of personal trauma serves the important 
public-political purpose of reiterating the human nature of the body 
that suffers.4 The Dalit narrator’s performance is the interplay of aes-
thetic and social drama: Limbale’s or Mane’s emotionally charged de-
scription (the aesthetic drama of the narrative) of their very individual 
hunger is linked with the processes that produce hunger in particular 
castes (the socio-political drama of the narrative). This element of Dalit 
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performance—which I argue is coded into the corporeal trauma and the 
affective component of the narrative—emphasizes the humanity of the 
protagonist. 
The emotional “performance” by the Dalit testimonio moves to an-
other level when the individual enmeshes his/her story (the “perform-
ance”) with that of the caste or community. The Dalit narrative’s role 
as a document about human rights demands that the protagonist of 
the narrative functions as a witness rather than an individual “hero” 
or “heroine.” Personal testimony functions doubly as the historical and 
socio-political witnessing of national structures of oppression. Indeed, 
the term “witness” derives its force from a performative: the capacity to 
provide evidence because of a first-hand experience. The autobiography, 
while foregrounding individual pain, suffering, and trauma, always ges-
tures at something beyond. The testimonios of Bama, Mane, Gaikwad 
and Limbale give voice not only to their own suffering but also to that 
of other victims who might otherwise remain voiceless. Dalit life writ-
ing has two components in its role as testimonio: its character as a col-
lective biography (Nayar, “Bama’s Karukku”) and the very structure of 
witnessing. 
Bama has stated that “The story told in Karukku was not my story 
alone. It was the depiction of a collective trauma—of my commu-
nity. . . . I just tried to freeze it forever in one book so that there will be 
something physical to remind people of the atrocities committed on a 
section of the society for ages” (Bama, “Recognition”). Her testimonio 
acts as a collective biography rather than simply her own life story. Like 
Bama, Mane declares in his preface: “Upara is not alone. . . .Upara’s suc-
cess is not the success of one man, it’s the success of a social movement” 
(14). Similarly, Limbale asserts that his work represents “the pain of 
millions in India” (Outcaste x). In Dalit life writing, unlike in a conven-
tional autobiography, the focus is not on the individual. And, unlike 
novels, which contain “problematic hero[s],” testimonios contain what 
Beverley terms “problematic collective situation[s]” (95)– in this case of 
caste, community and class.
Dalit life writing places the individual life in the public domain. It 
takes highly personal experiences and makes them public, blurring the 
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line between what can and cannot be said. Thus, life inside the home—
generally regarded as a safe haven for children or as a private space—is 
revealed as brutal, unjust and oppressive. The narrator moves the pain 
outward from the individual body to the community body, revealing the 
dangers, injustices, and cruelties of the “private” space of home or the 
“secure” space of the democratic state. 
Limbale, for instance, locates his flawed family life, parentage and up-
bringing within the social system. He reveals what ought to be a shame-
ful secret (his problematic individual situation as an illegitimate son) 
by using it as a critique of the social structure. He notes that his father 
belongs to the upper caste Lingayat community but that his mother’s 
side of the family is Mahar. He admits that he is illegitimate before 
concluding: “Half of me belongs to the village, whereas the other half 
is excommunicated. Who am I? To whom is my umbilical cord con-
nected?” (Outcaste 38–9).
Limbale discovers that he is a border-crosser through no fault of his 
own. This personal secret becomes a public document of atrocity, ex-
ploitation, and caste-linked gender oppression. Limbale converts the 
story of his shame into statements that sound like aphorisms. He de-
clares that “to be born beautiful among Dalits is a curse,” and states 
that his mother “was beautiful and suffered for it” (Outcaste 37–8). 
Limbale converts personal experiences of suffering into truisms that 
capture the condition of an entire community’s shame. The revela-
tion of such secrets defines Dalit life writing as collective biography. By 
breaking down the barrier between private and public, the Dalit pro-
tagonist serves as a witness. 
Thus, the Dalit autobiographical narrative works as a testimonio 
through a process of narrating a collective biography, by rendering 
public what is private, and by locating the private within the public. 
The Dalit narrator is, like the narrator of a trauma memoir, a witness 
who recounts his/her personal trauma as well as that of the community. 
Contextually, such narratives must be located as witnesses within the 
dynamics of rights discourses and atrocity inquiries. Karukku or The 
Outcaste must be seen within the context of social movements against 
caste oppression and media reportage of atrocities. 
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II. Dalit Life Writing and the Ethics of Witnessing
Two crucial elements make up what I call “the ethics of witnessing” in 
Dalit life writing. One is the narrator-author’s own “performance” of 
the drama of personal and communal aesthetic and social suffering. The 
second is the injunction upon the reader to bear witness to whatever is 
recorded. Dalit testimonio is akin to the genre of legal testimony in that 
it is evidence that asks readers and listeners to bear witness.5 The testi-
monio is structured around the witnessing by the Dalit survivor-narrator 
(primary witnessing) and by the reader who bears witness to the Dalit’s 
witnessing document (secondary witnessing). The primary witness is the 
victim who is, in the process of writing the memoir, engaged in a “ret-
rospective testimonial act” (Hesford 106). Primary witnessing involves 
two overlapping components: narration of personal battles and survival, 
and speaking for the Other. 
In the first component, the Dalit’s narrative approximates a heroic 
narrative. The Dalit narrator points to the individual victim’s rise to 
success, the trials, and traumas the individual overcomes, and the pro-
tagonist’s recognition of his or her selfhood. Dalit life writing charts the 
protagonist’s trials and strategies of survival. Bama’s narrative, for exam-
ple, highlights her individual achievements and thus enacts a particular 
kind of self: heroic, successful, and determined (Karukku 18, 64, 71, 
75). Similarly, Gaikwad describes how he contested elections, opened a 
bicycle repair store, filed police and court cases about atrocities, acquired 
a motorcycle, took loans, started a general store and worked at creating 
a movement about the Nomadic and Denotified Tribes (Gaikwad 166, 
187, 196, 231–3). The last line of Mane’s Upara reads: “I .  .  . was to 
recover from this terrible affliction of caste and stand upright again on 
my feet” (212). Mane demonstrates his overcoming of difficult circum-
stances through individual effort. Bhoomkar suggests that Upara em-
bodies “the growth of a political consciousness” (Mane xxi). The Dalit 
text is aligned with the Bildungsroman, in which the individual’s growth, 
battles with society, and ultimate triumph constitute the main narrative 
(Slaughter 2006). 
In the second component of primary witnessing, the narrator moves 
from the absolute singularity of her or his suffering to the suffering of 
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others. It is in the recognition of the (Dalit, traumatized) Other—that 
is, by bearing witness to another Dalit—that the protagonist of the Dalit 
narrative discovers her or his own humanity. The primary witness moves 
from seeing the Other’s suffering to voicing a demand. Witnessing is 
the reconstruction of seen events in verbal narrative elsewhere. Voicing 
is advocacy wherein the primary witness proposes a programme for the 
community, nation, or even humanity. This is the ethics of primary wit-
nessing: to narrate from memory the atrocities of the self and Others, 
for it is the survivor’s duty to remember (Agamben 26). 
Advocacy occurs when a testimonio moves from the individual to the 
collective. In the latter part of her Preface, Bama writes that “In order 
to change this state of affairs, all Dalits who have been deprived of their 
basic rights must function as God’s word. . . . Instead of being more and 
more beaten down and blunted, they unite, think about their rights, 
and battle for them” (Karukku xiii). Valmiki makes the issue of voicing a 
key part of his own Preface: “The Dalit readers had seen their own pain 
in those pages of mine. They all desired that I write about my own expe-
riences in greater detail” (vii). His readers, having seen their own pain in 
Valmiki’s Joothan, want him to elaborate his suffering, almost as though 
it is their pain that he is describing. 
If, as the primary witness, the Dalit narrator moves from a narration of 
her or his heroic survival towards a voicing or advocacy of the suffering 
of another, he also seeks to build a common platform with sympathetic 
others by making a demand on his readers. Thus, Mane asks his readers 
to understand and work towards the alleviation of the suffering of the 
nomadic tribes (13–14). Secondary witnessing suggests the “possibilities 
for solidarity and affiliations among critics, interviewers, translators and 
the subject who ‘speaks’” (Caplan). The Dalit text places an imperative 
upon its readers to respond in certain ways to the text. 
Mini Krishnan’s editorial comments, discussed earlier, highlight the 
significance of Bama’s text and position readers as secondary witnesses 
by drawing them into the process of evidentiary testimony. Lakshmi 
Holström, Bama’s translator, suggests, “What is demanded of the reader 
is, in Gayatri Spivak’s term ‘a surrender to the special call of the text’. . . . 
And as readers of her [Bama’s] work, we are asked for nothing less than 
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an imaginative entry into that different world of experience and its po-
litical struggle” (Karukku vii). The suggestion of an “imaginative entry” 
is actually a demand that readers respond sympathetically, as humans, 
to the narrative’s trauma. In her introduction to Joothan, Mukherjee 
also insists that Joothan “demands a radical shift from the upper caste 
and upper class reader by insisting that such a reader not forget his/her 
caste or class privilege” (xxxvii). What is underlined here, as Holström’s 
introduction emphasizes, is the difference to which readers must respond 
compassionately as humans; that is, readers must situate themselves 
imaginatively in the contexts described within the texts. It is in this 
response that the listeners define their humanity—this is the ethics of 
listening to Dalit life testimony. But it is also in this dimension of listen-
ing that the crisis of witnessing arises: how are listeners to respond to the 
sheer singularity of the suffering in the Dalit text?
The Dalit text, to adopt Shoshana Felman’s description of testimonial 
narrative, must be treated as a “point of conflation between text and life, 
a textual testimony which can penetrate us like an actual life” (Felman 
2). It must, that is, possess the power of something greater than a mere 
text. One way of experiencing this textual power would be to relate to 
the text with what Dominick LaCapra has termed “empathetic unsettle-
ment” (699). The listener respects the sheer otherness of the victim; one 
cannot, under any circumstances, incorporate the Other into ourselves, 
or stand in for the victim. In LaCapra’s terms, one cannot identify with 
the victim but can register and reflect upon, for oneself as well as others, 
the trauma and the unsettlement. The contract between the Dalit text 
and its readers, then, presents an ethics of witnessing. “Secondary wit-
nessing,” as LaCapra terms the process, means paying attention to the 
irreducible heterogeneity of Dalit space, empathizing with it, never 
standing in for the Dalit, but seeing the narrative’s performance as an 
aesthetic and social drama that entails particular forms of reading (699). 
Or, to borrow Wendy Hesford’s phrase, the text calls for a process of 
“rhetorical listening.” 
“Rhetorical listening” demands that readers hear voices such as 
Limbale’s or Bama’s alongside those of the other, silent Dalits.6 Narrators 
of Dalit gesture towards both witnessing and “rhetorical listening.” 
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Bama has admitted that “There were many significant things that [she] 
chose not to recall in Karukku” (Bama, “Recognition”). Similarly, 
Valmiki states, “In the process of writing these words, a lot has remained 
unsaid. I did not manage to put it all down. It was beyond my power” 
(viii). Both statements implicitly argue that trauma exists beyond what 
is represented in the text. This absence at the heart of testimonio may 
in fact constitute its true value (Agamben 34, 145, 158). Testimony’s 
“truth,” argues Anne Cubilié, is an interplay of consciousness, memory 
and community, of the narrator’s physical experiences, the sights she or 
he saw, and the actions she or he took as part of a larger group (242–43). 
The reiteration by the survivor of her or his inability to speak and bear 
witness to all that has happened emphasizes the traumatic valence of the 
narrative. The silences that Bama and Valmiki discuss gesture toward the 
many Dalits whose pain can only be staged through their particular sur-
vivor’s narratives and to whose suffering the readers must somehow bear 
witness. “Rhetorical listening” asks readers to imagine, through their 
consumption of the narrative, a trauma beyond textual representation. 
Bama engages with this aspect of witnessing when she asks: “Are Dalits 
not human beings? Do they not have common sense? Do they not have 
such attributes as a sense of honour and self respect? Are they without 
wisdom, beauty, dignity? What do we lack?” (Karukku 24). Bama tran-
sitions from describing Dalits to a broader description of humanity in 
which Dalits share the attributes inventoried. She asks readers to be at-
tentive to the conditions in which some members of the human species 
are denied human attributes; it is this traumatic context that readers 
must consciously witness.
Secondary witnessing thus complicates the process of reading Dalit 
texts. On the one hand, secondary witnessing asks that readers pay at-
tention to it as a singular event of trauma. On the other, it asks that 
readers move beyond it, to see the text as a metonym for something that 
is—and can only be—presented through this particular text. In other 
words, an act of ethical listening would be to understand that Bama 
constitutes only one voice in the midst of many Dalit silences. 
Testimony of trauma always includes the hearer (Laub). The bodily 
“distress” of the Dalit would mean nothing without our commitment 
254
Pr amod  K .  Naya r
as hearers and secondary witnesses, to keep the event “open,” to adapt 
Lauren Berlant’s argument about trauma narratives (Berlant). Keeping 
the event open means that it must be transmitted outward in order 
to gather more secondary witnesses of the event. Thus Arun Prabha 
Mukherjee hopes that her translation of Joothan will arouse the reader’s 
“empathy” (Valmiki xl). What she calls for, I suggest, is a process of 
engagement with both textual and extra-textual contexts of a Dalit nar-
rative in which the reader functions as a secondary witness.
Conclusion: Dalit Life Writing as Human Rights Narratives 
Dalit life writing generates evidentiary documents and narratives 
about human rights in postcolonial India. Life writing occupies a key 
role in the demand for human rights and is located within what Hugh 
Gorringe has called a “repertoire of protest” of Dalit campaigns, agita-
tions, and even violence (Gorringe). Dalit life writing belies dominant 
triumphalist narratives of economic prosperity and the achievement of 
democracy in India and provides a parallel narrative tradition revealing 
the violated human rights of individuals and entire communities. Dalit 
authors point out that the trauma of Dalits is at least partly the conse-
quence of a flawed religious and historical narrative tradition, inasmuch 
as Hindu law, colonial discourses and practices, colonialism, and post-
independent Indian politics rely upon narratives that construct the Dalit 
as a lesser human being within the Indian nation. Valmiki contends, 
“There would be speeches on Republic Day when narratives of devo-
tion to the country were repeatedly told, but they never included the 
name of the maker of the Constitution [Dr. Ambedkar]” (71). Building 
on his critique of India’s dominant narratives, Valmiki writes that “the 
lie that the textbooks had been injecting in my veins in the name of 
cultural heritage had been shattered” (121); his experiences ran counter 
to the textbook narratives of equality and rights. The textbooks con-
struct “mythologies” of “chivalry, of ideals,” while what actually exists is 
a “defeated social order” (134). Referring to the myths that enable and 
justify upper caste oppression of the Dalits, Limbale says, “My tongue 
is circumscribed by Manu’s innumerable laws” (Outcaste 90). Kancha 
Ilaiah rejects cultural texts that have defined the human or “Indian” in 
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exclusionary ways. Ilaiah writes: “We knew nothing of Brahma, Vishnu 
or Eswara until we entered school. When we first heard about these 
figures they were as strange to us as Allah or Jehova or Jesus were” (7). 
“We had been excluded from history,” notes Ilaiah about textbooks 
and history writings that excluded Dalit beliefs and practices (54). 
With this exclusion theme, Dalit life writings expose the duplicity of 
dominant discourses within India, generating a different history of 
India because, with their narrative recovery of trauma, they point to the 
faultlines, conflicts, and repression within dominant historical narra-
tives. Gaikwad describes how, as a school boy, he wrote a letter to Indira 
Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, in which he asked her: “when is 
Gandhiji’s dream going to be fulfilled?” (79). Gaikwad’s narrative coun-
teracts the historical narrative of Indira Gandhi’s “Garibi hatao” [remove 
poverty] movement. Other Dalit narratives, in the same fashion, reveal 
that, decades after political independence, social justice is still a dream 
for Dalits. They reveal, to use Nancy Miller and Jason Tougaw’s apposite 
phrase, “the shame of modernity” (5). 
Dalit testimonio narratives such as the ones explored in this essay are 
narratives of loss and survival. They also generate what Kay Schaffer and 
Sidonie Smith identify as the key effects of life narratives: affect, activ-
ism, and awareness (225). They build solidarities through the charged 
content of their life narratives, build awareness of the hidden history of 
India, and enable the making of activist intervention by those who are 
affected by what they read. This is a dual process of “translation”—a 
process that translates Dalit life and contexts for the world to recog-
nize, and translates an emotionally charged “performance” or narrative 
into a larger discourse of rights. When, in 2002, the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination declared 
caste to be a form of racism, it mapped a global structure of oppres-
sion (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2002). 
It is upon this map that Dalit life narratives insert themselves. If 
human rights narratives are linked, as Schaffer and Smith suggest, to 
global agendas of justice, Dalit testimonio narratives fit directly into this 
twentieth-century mediascape of testimony, truth-telling, and advocacy 
(Schaffer and Smith 20). Readings of Dalit life writing must forever 
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move beyond the immediate textual representation of trauma or suffer-
ing to the unspoken exergues: the voiceless and the disempowered who 
are available to readers only through the “presence” of Bama or Limbale. 
The link between Dalit testimonio and human rights discourses is also 
future-directed at two levels: (i) there is always a temporal gap between 
the moment of witnessing and the moment of bearing witness, and (ii) 
the bearing witness is directed at a future program of emancipation and 
justice through the recognition of Dalits as humans. The testimonios 
constitute the preliminary moments, the evidence and the demand for 
emancipation and rights.
Dalit life writing creates a space where two key “rights” narratives 
are played out. First, the narratives serve as what I term “claims narra-
tives,” texts that open spaces of deliberation with their claims of cultural 
trauma and demands for justice. Michael Ignatieff argues that, when 
victims speak, “rights language applies” because “it is the claim of abuse 
that sets a human rights process moving” (56). The emphasis is on the 
narrative—claims—that sets the process and politics of rights on its 
course. Rights discourses, Ignatieff points out, are built on the founda-
tions of human history and the “testimony of fear,” both of which, inci-
dentally, rely upon narratives (80). Such “claims narratives” need not be 
articulated as rational discourse or demands for rights. I propose (aware 
of the risk of reinstating the old binary of rational West versus emotional 
East) that “claims narratives” are often cast in the language of emotion 
and trauma—but this cannot be a reason for excluding them from the 
public sphere or the realm of human rights debates. The “testimony of 
fear” that Ignatieff refers to relies, I suggest, precisely on such emotional 
narratives of brutalization, suffering, and injustice. It is the presence and 
acknowledgement of these narratives that provoke what Ignatieff terms 
“deliberation,” because the “minimum condition” for deliberation is a 
“willingness to remain in the same room, listening to claims one doesn’t 
like to hear” (84). The “claims narrative” first fits itself into a main-
stream and universal discourse of rights because it maps their violations 
for individuals and communities. Here the appeal is to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, international agencies and tribunals—in 
short, to the global community. Scholars writing on Dalit rights have 
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invariably situated this discourse in relation to global discourses and 
castigated the Indian government for refusing to see caste-based oppres-
sion as another form of racist discrimination (Pal 9–16; Thorat 67–80; 
Shinde). Others have argued that a transnational Dalit politics and 
movement seems to be emerging (Smith). 
Dalit claims narratives move from the local to the global when taken 
up in forums such as the 2002 World Conference Against Racism. This 
move enables the making of what Thomas Laqueur has termed a “moral 
imagination” to expand the capacity to feel the “exigency of wrongs suf-
fered by strangers at a distance” (Laqueur 134). Once more I return to 
the question of imagination: to be able, when called upon, to imagine 
distant suffering when we consume the narrative we hold in our hands. 
It is in the global circulation of local wrongs via narrative that I find 
Dalit life writing’s insertion into universal discourses of rights.
Dalit life narratives also carve out a space for themselves within Indian 
public space—what sociologists following Nancy Fraser’s influential for-
mulation have termed “counter-publics”—and discourses of rights. In 
some cases, this aspect of Dalit writing can be traced back to the nine-
teenth century (Fraser; Rege 32; Constable; Beth). Gopal Guru points 
out that Dalits need to retain their unique cultural identity and pleads 
for Dalit collective and cultural rights as different but equal “citizens” 
within Indian rights discourses. Dalits claim justice from Indian society 
because they envisage, rightly, their oppression as a collective condition 
within Indian society. 
But how do Dalit communities form a counter-public? They do so 
by presenting affective narratives of suffering, thereby generating what I 
have called “claims narratives.” Human rights claims are implicit within 
narratives of atrocity in which the atrocity proceeds from an unjust 
social order. My reading of these texts as trauma narratives suggests a 
narrative form that seeks to capture and convey a horrific social system. 
The trauma narrative and the related strategies of performance, staging, 
and witnessing enable the narrator to move beyond herself to a larger 
community, and therefore to stake a (rights) claim on behalf of that 
community. The body of Dalit life writing constitutes a tradition of 
such trauma-affect-claims narratives of human rights violations. As I 
258
Pr amod  K .  Naya r
have argued elsewhere in the case of women’s writing from India, these 
texts represent an “archive of trauma”.7
Further, this archive of trauma in Dalit life writing invites readers to 
map a comparative history of trauma, inasmuch as it embodies “affect” 
that can reach across geographical and political barriers. There is consid-
erable risk, of course, in calling for such a history, because oppression is 
not the same in either form or impact across the world. Such a homog-
enization erases the specificities of the local in favour of over-arching 
connections on the global level. Occasionally, the interaction of the local 
and global is conflictual, and so to subsume the local (Dalits in India, 
blacks in the United States, Aboriginals in Canada and Australia) under 
the global may perpetuate the very structural inequalities that produce 
the trauma. Nevertheless, it may be possible to think of a solidarity of 
suffering through which victims can constitute a new political order that 
restrains, in however minimal a fashion, the march of global oppression.
Ashis Nandy proposes a system in which territories and expressions 
of suffering can be linked, a schema that can be productively applied to 
demonstrate how a comparative history of trauma can be developed. 
Nandy, arguing a case for treating the Third World’s suffering as repre-
sentative of global suffering, writes: 
The only way the Third World can transcend the sloganeering of its 
well-wishers 
is, first, by becoming a collective representation of the victims 
of man-made suffering everywhere in the world and in all past 
times; second, by internalizing or owning up to the outside 
forces of oppression and, then, coping with them as inner vec-
tors; and third by recognizing the oppressed or marginalized 
selves of the First and Second Worlds as civilizational allies in 
the battle against institutionalized suffering. (Nandy, “Third 
World Utopia” 441)
R. Radhakrishnan proposes that Nandy suggests an entirely different 
“content” for Third World utopias based on suffering (97) and makes 
a case for seeing suffering as a “universal and omni-locational phenom-
enon” (98–99). On the contrary, I have elsewhere argued that Nandy 
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proposes nothing short of an “affective cosmopolitanism that “builds 
on affect, empathy and an ethics of recognition of the Other’s suffering” 
(Nayar, “Affective Cosmopolitanism” 8).
Nandy’s “affective cosmopolitanism” constitutes a comparative his-
tory of trauma, mapping suffering across places and thereby generating a 
new geography of the world, which provides a record of absent, abused, 
and rejected human rights. Comparative histories of trauma therefore 
are not only about Rwanda or Abu Ghraib or India, about blacks or 
Pathans or Dalits. They expand the notion of “human rights” to include 
all peoples whose rights have been eroded and who have suffered as a 
result. Nandy’s call to respond to the suffering of the Other is answered 
by treating Dalit life writing in a global literary context (thereby also of-
fering a new vision of “world literatures”). This literary context, in turn, 
allows human rights to live up to their potential universality. 
While this might seem a homogenizing move that erases the histori-
cal specificity of suffering (surely the genocides of Rwanda, the torture 
in Abu Ghraib, and the intergenerational trauma of Indian Dalits are 
different), I view such a homogenizing as essential if human rights dis-
courses have to be relevant to all parts of the world. Drawing upon 
Nandy’s work, I propose a cosmopolitanism of affect and suffering in 
order to facilitate a cosmopolitanism of human rights and emancipa-
tory movements. If such a cosmopolitanism demands a certain (admit-
tedly problematic) homogenizing, then I advocate it as a cost in the 
cause of a global discourse of suffering and human rights. The suffering 
Dalit within life writing narratives develops a certain subject-position. 
This subject position can be aligned with similar suffering subject-posi-
tions worldwide, even if their suffering emerges from different contexts. 
Such a literature of suffering generates what I call abject-types (in line 
with “archetypes” and, in the context of cyberculture, what Nakamura 
terms “cybertypes”). Abject-types are figures of abjection occurring in 
literatures of trauma across the world that are remarkably similar to 
each other and that possess qualities that are iterable out of context (for 
instance, in terms of “staging” and “performance,” affect and corporeal-
ity). Abject-types, I propose, are tropes in the discourse of suffering and 
are universal. 
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I must stress that I view Dalit life writing texts as developing the 
theme of human rights only implicitly via discourses of trauma, testi-
mony, and the representation of abject-types. I am more concerned with 
the appropriation of these texts in global contexts. How best can we 
incorporate these texts into a global discourse of trauma? I have outlined 
the answer in the preceding two paragraphs: we should treat these texts 
as demonstrating human rights violations and locate them within inter-
textual networks of similar discourses and literary texts. We should see 
them as embodying suffering from varied locations and political forma-
tions but unified in their emphasis on suffering and injustice. They may 
not explicitly address human rights philosophies, politics, or conven-
tions—that task is left to us when we “consume” these texts and respond 
ethically to them. 
Life writing texts across continents and cultures help to define the 
locations where human rights are absent or insufficient. If, as Brooks 
argues, testimonios serve “intercultural exchange” (187), Dalit life writ-
ing is a genre that simultaneously foregrounds the uniqueness of the 
caste-based oppression in Indian society and aligns itself with trauma 
narratives from around the world. It finds its place beside trauma nar-
ratives from Guatemala, Sudan, Rwanda, Serbia, and any location in 
which the “human” is called into question and redefined as the abject. 
Notes
 1 There is, of course, a paradox in that the Dalit narrative seeks to deconstruct 
“caste” as part of its political agenda yet also grounds caste oppression as “em-
bodied subjectivity” that reinstates the Dalit body as “abject-type.” While ac-
knowledging the risks involved in such an essentialism as “abject-type,” I also see 
it as necessary to the Dalit narrative’s focus on corporeal and emotional trauma. 
Trauma cannot be explained merely as an abstract condition. In the Dalit case 
it requires a body, even if in the process of essentialising the Dalit’s abject-body 
trauma reinstates caste difference and stereotypes. I see abject-types as an ante-
rior moment to deconstructing caste where the Dalit narrative shows the trau-
matized body to foreground affect, trauma, and injustice. 
 2 I adapt here Hirsch’s work on the “transgenerational transmission of trauma.”
 3 The problematics of authenticating atrocity narratives is beyond the scope of this 
essay. However, I acknowledge the significance of questions such as what kind of 
“internal” authentication—ethnographic details, historical facts, or experiential 
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accounts—is possible in texts documenting social or historical atrocities (for 
instance, in African American slave narratives; contemporary domestic abuse 
narratives; or war survivor memoirs)? And what constitutes external authentica-
tion? Who is “qualified” to authenticate the narrative? And what role does doubt 
on the part of witnesses play in authenticity (see Goldberg)?
 4 There is, of course, considerable risk involved in representing poverty and suffer-
ing. Such narratives have been accused on a regular basis in mainstream Indian 
newspapers of using Indian/Asian/African poverty as a saleable commodity, as an 
exotic form of pornography (commonly referred to as “poverty porn”) catering 
to elite (Western) audiences. How does one distinguish the Dalit’s self-repre-
sentation of authentic suffering from the sensationalized “poverty porn” of, say, 
Danny Boyle (whose film Slumdog Millionaire, much reviled in India, won eight 
Oscars)? Whose politics and what politics (emancipation? commodification for 
profit?) are served by the representations? 
 5 See Nayar, “Bama’s Karukku.”
 6 See Nayar, “Bama’s Karukku.”
 7 See Nayar, “Trauma, Testimony and Human Rights.”
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